Abstract. We consider the guessing secrets problem defined by Chung et al. [2001] . This is a variant of the standard 20 questions game where the player has a set of k > 1 secrets from a universe of N possible secrets. The player is asked Boolean questions about the secret. For each question, the player picks one of the k secrets adversarially, and answers according to this secret.
Introduction
Under the familiar 20 questions game, a player, say B, tries to discover the identity of some unknown secret drawn by a second player, say A, from a large space of N secrets. B is allowed to ask binary (Yes/No) questions about the secret to A (refer to I've Got a Secret [1952] ). The assumption is that A answers each question truthfully according to the secret he picked. The goal of B is to recover the secret by asking as few questions as possible. Clearly, log N questions are both necessary and sufficient to discover the secret (here and in the rest of the article, all logarithms are in base 2). Now, consider the following variant of the aforesaid game. Under this variant, the player A picks not one, but a set of k ≥ 2 secrets. For each question asked by B, A gets to adversarially choose which one of the k secrets to use in supplying the answer, but having made the choice must answer truthfully according to the chosen secret. (When questions have binary answers, this imposes the restriction that if all secrets give the same answer on a given question, then A must answer accordingly, else it can give any answer to the given question.) This variant was introduced by Chung et al. [2001] , and they called the problem "Guessing Secrets." What is the best strategy for B in this situation, and how many questions does it take in the worst case for B to find the secrets? In addition to being an interesting puzzle, secret guessing problems of this type have apparently arisen recently in connection with certain Internet traffic routing applications [Chung et al. 2001] . Moreover, problems of a related nature have been studied in the literature under the label of separating systems (see Körner and Simonyi [1988] , Segalovich [1994] , and Cohen et al. [2001] and references therein), and have been applied in different areas of computer science such as technical diagnosis, constructions of hash functions, and authenticating ownership claims. A variant of separating systems (referred to under the name of bipartite graphs with the isolated neighbor condition) were also used in Gál [1998] to prove lower bounds for monotone span programs. The focus of much of this line of work has been combinatorial, and our work, as well as that of Chung et al. [2002] and Micciancio and Segerlind [2001] , done independently, appear to be the first to present nontrivial algorithms to deal with (certain kinds of) separating systems.
Specifically, in this article we present an algorithmic solution using list decoding to a problem left open by the work of Chung et al. [2001] dealing with the case of k = 2 secrets. We also obtain some new results concerning adaptive and oblivious schemes for guessing k > 2 secrets, showing upper and lower bounds on the number of questions needed.
The article assumes knowledge of some standard terminology and definitions concerning error-correcting codes. We quickly recollect some of the basic terminology we will use to follow. A code C of block length n over an alphabet is a subset of n . The elements of C are called codewords. The code is called a linear code if is a field and C is a subspace of the n-dimensional vector space n . The minimum distance of a code is the smallest Hamming distance between two distinct codewords. The relative distance is the minimum distance divided by the block length. For linear codes, the minimum distance equals the smallest Hamming weight of a nonzero codeword, and the code can also be viewed as a linear map from k to n , where k is called the dimension of the code. A linear code of dimension k and block length n over a field of size q is customarily denoted as an [n, k] q code. Its rate is the ratio k/n. The problem of list decoding a code C from a fraction α of errors consists of, given a received word y ∈ n , finding a list of all codewords that differ from y in at most αn coordinates. We will also need the concept of recovery from erasures: List decoding from a fraction γ of erasures corresponds to finding a list of all codewords consistent with a received word z, the symbols at γ n of whose positions are erased, that is, are unknown, while the rest are known correctly (and it is also known which γ n positions are erased). We will also need results concerning some other coding-theoretic concepts like concatenated codes and Reed-Solomon codes, which will be described when they are needed.
1.1. PRIOR WORK. We defer a formal definition of what it means to solve the 2-secrets problem to the next section. We now briefly describe the prior work on this problem, followed by a description of our results. Chung et al. [2001] prove that for the 2-secrets problem with a universe of N secrets, there exists a set of O(log N ) questions, the answers to which suffice to solve the problem. They also present an explicit set of O(log 2 N ) questions, the answers to which allows one to find the two secrets. However, they did not present an efficient (with runtime polynomial in log N ) algorithm to recover the secrets, given the answers to the questions. Chung et al. [2002] present an explicit strategy using O(log 3 N ) questions, together with an algorithm to recover the secrets in O(log 3 N ) time given answers to these questions. Nonetheless, in this result the number of questions used is much more than the optimal O(log N ). The question of finding an explicit set of O(log N ) questions together with an efficient secret-recovery algorithm, given answers to those questions, was the central question left open by the work of Chung et al. [2001] .
1.2. OUR RESULTS. In this article, we settle this open question. Specifically, using a connection to ε-biased spaces, we present an explicit set of O(log N ) questions for the 2-secrets problem, together with an efficient O(log 3 N )-time secret-recovery algorithm, using ideas from list decoding of error-correcting codes. Note that up to a constant factor, this is the fewest possible number of questions. To be precise, our algorithm finds the maximum possible information about the two secrets which A picked. This algorithmic result, described in Sections 3 and 4, is our main contribution to the guessing secrets problem. We next describe some of the other results we obtain.
Using a straightforward connection to 2k-universal sets, we also explicitly describe a set of c k log N questions for the k-secrets problem, for any k ≥ 3. We do not, however, give an efficient decoding algorithm to recover the secrets, given answers to these questions (see Section 1.4 for pointers to subsequent work which resolves this issue). The constant c k depends exponentially on k. We also prove that this exponential dependence of c k on k is necessary, even if B is allowed to pick the questions adaptively, that is, depending upon A's answers to previous questions. On the other hand, all of our positive results yield a nonadaptive or oblivious strategy for B; namely B can fix the set of questions to be asked right at the outset.
1.3. RELATED WORK. Independent of our work, Micciancio and Segerlind [2001] presented a different strategy with the optimal O(log N ) questions, together with an O(log 2 N )-time algorithm to recover the secrets. The difference between their result and ours is that our questions are oblivious or nonadaptive, whereas in the strategy of Micciancio and Segerlind [2001] , B picks the questions adaptively, depending upon A's answers to previous questions. On the other hand, their strategy uses only 4 log N + 3 questions, which in fact matches the best-known existence results presented in Chung et al. [2001] , while also providing an efficient secret-recovery algorithm. The constant in front of log N in our O(log N ) bound for number of questions is perhaps much worse. Thus the results in Micciancio and Segerlind [2001] are incomparable to ours. We elaborate further on adaptive and oblivious strategies and motivate why the latter are interesting in the next section.
1.4. SUBSEQUENT WORK ON GUESSING MORE THAN TWO SECRETS. Subsequent to the publication of the conference version of this article [Alon et al. 2002] , there has been progress on efficient secret-recovery algorithms for the case of k > 2 secrets. For the case of three secrets, Micciancio and Segerlind [2004] present an explicit adaptive strategy with O(log N ) queries, as well as an oblivious strategy with O(log 5 N ) queries, together with an efficient secret-recovery algorithm. Razborov [2005] has solved the k-secrets problem for every k ≥ 2; he presented an oblivious strategy with an explicit set of 2 O(k) log N questions, together with a 2 O(k 2 ) log 2 N -time secret-recovery algorithm. His techniques are also based on list decoding and extend the techniques from this article.
Formal Problem Description
We first restrict ourselves to the case k = 2 when there are only two secrets. This is already a nontrivial case and, as we shall see, one where a very satisfactory solution exists to the aforesaid problem. In this case, A has a set X = {x 1 , x 2 } of two secrets chosen from a universe U of N possible secrets. Next, we proceed to precisely formulate the algorithmic problem that B wishes to (and can hope to) solve. (The reader familiar with the paper Chung et al. [2001] probably already knows the formal definition, and can skip the next few paragraphs.)
Note that A can always choose to answer according to the secret x 1 , and thus B can never hope to learn with certainty more than one of A's secrets. Moreover, a moment's thought reveals that B cannot even hope to pin down with certainty one secret and claim that it must be one of A's. This is because A could pick three secrets {x 1 , x 2 , x 3 } and answer each question according to the majority vote of the answers of x 1 , x 2 , x 3 . For such a strategy, irrespective of the number of questions B asks, A can always justify any subset of two of these secrets as the set X he picked.
In light of this, it turns out that the best that B can hope for is the following: For every set of two disjoint pairs of secrets X = {x 1 , x 2 } and Y = {x 3 , x 4 }, where the x i 's are all distinct, rule out one of X or Y as the set which A picked. An instructive way to visualize this requirement is in terms of graphs. Let K N denote the complete graph on the universe U of N secrets. View a pair of secrets X = {x 1 , x 2 } as an edge (x 1 , x 2 ) of K N . A question is simply a function F : U → {0, 1}, and the answer to it naturally induces a partition U = F −1 (0) ∪ F −1 (1). If A answers question F with a bit b ∈ {0, 1}, then we know that the set X which A picked must satisfy X ∩ F −1 (b) = ∅, and hence B can eliminate all edges within the subgraph of K N spanned by F −1 (1 − b). Stated in this language, the goal of B is to ask a series of questions by which he can eliminate all edges except those in a set W that contains no pair of disjoint edges. Now, there are only two possibilities for such a surviving set W . Either W must be a "star," namely, a set of edges all sharing a common x 0 , or W must be a "triangle," namely, the set of three edges amongst a set {x 1 , x 2 , x 3 } of three secrets. In the former case, B can assert that x 0 must be one of A's secrets. In the latter case, B can assert that the secret pair of A is one of (x 1 , x 2 ), (x 2 , x 3 ), or (x 3 , x 1 ). In the sequel, when we use the phrase "find the secrets" we implicitly assume that we mean finding the underlying star or triangle, as the case may be. We also use the phrase "solve the 2-secrets problem" to refer to the task of finding the underlying star or triangle.
Oblivious vs. adaptive strategies. There are two possible strategies that one can consider for B: adaptive and oblivious (also called nonadaptive). For adaptive strategies, each question of B can depend on A's answers to the previous questions. For oblivious strategies B must fix the set of questions to be asked right at the outset and be able to infer the secrets based just on A's answers to those fixed questions.
Definitely, adaptive strategies seem more natural for a "20 questions" kind of setup, since this is what a human would use when playing such a game. However, oblivious strategies have the merit of being easy to play (as well as more democratic in terms of different players' abilities), since one just has to read out a fixed predetermined set of questions. Moreover, as we shall see, it is possible to do surprisingly well just using oblivious strategies. In fact, it turns out that there exist oblivious strategies that find the secrets using just O(log N ) questions, which is only a constant factor off the obvious lower bound of log N on the number of necessary questions. Moreover, the quest for oblivious strategies runs into some intriguing combinatorial questions, and leads us, quite surprisingly, into list-decodable codes! Hence, we focus mainly on oblivious strategies here. A probabilistic construction shows that O(log N ) questions are sufficient to solve the 2-secrets problem [Chung et al. 2001] . But this only proves the existence of good strategies and the questions are not explicitly specified. In the next section, we discuss how certain binary codes give explicit oblivious strategies.
An Explicit Strategy with O(log N ) Questions

A CHARACTERIZATION OF OBLIVIOUS STRATEGIES USING SEPARATING
CODES. An oblivious strategy for B is simply a sequence F of n Boolean functions
We say that a strategy solves the 2-secrets guessing problem if the answers to the questions f i bring down the possible pairs of secrets to a star or triangle.
For each secret x ∈ [N ], we denote the sequence of answers to the questions f i on x by C(x) = f 1 (x), f 2 (x), . . . , f n (x) . We suggestively call the mapping
n , thus defined as the code used by the strategy. There is clearly a one-one correspondence between oblivious strategies F and such codes C (defined by f i (x) = C(x) i , where C(x) i is the ith bit of C(x)). Hence, we will from now on refer to a strategy F using its associated code C.
We say that a code C is (2, 2)-separating (or simply separating) if for every 4-tuple of distinct secrets a, b, c, d ∈ [N ] , there exists at least one value of i, 1
Note that if B asks questions according to a separating code C, then for every two disjoint pairs of edges (a, b) and (c, d), B can rule out one of them based on the answer which A gives on the ith question, where i is a discriminating index for the 4-tuple (a, b, c, d) ). In fact, it is easy to see that the (2, 2)-separating property of C is also necessary for the corresponding strategy to solve the 2-secrets guessing game.
This implies the following characterization for the existence of oblivious strategies for the 2-secrets guessing game. Hence the problem of finding a small set of questions to solve the 2-secrets problem reduces to the task of finding a good (2, 2)-separating code. There is a reason why we called these objects "codes," since the following result states that any error-correcting code with a certain property is also a (2, 2)-separating code. We will assume without loss of generality that N = 2 m so that we can view each secret as an m-bit binary string. The separating code C then encodes an m-bit string into an n-bit string. 
The preceding lemma is proved in Cohen et al. [2001] . The result for linear codes had been previously proved by Segalovich [1994] . For the case of general codes, note that the
We can strengthen the previous lemma to show that d > n/2 itself is a sufficient condition for a code to be (2, 2)-separating (we also show this is indeed a strengthening in that there are codes that satisfy the condition d > n/2 and that do not satisfy d > m 1 /2 + n/4). Since the result is not directly related to the theme of the article, we relegate it to Appendix A.
There is a big advantage in using linear codes C for B's strategy, since then each question simply asks for the inner product over GF(2) of the secret with a fixed m-bit string. Thus all questions have a succinct description, which is not the case for general nonlinear codes. Hence, we focus exclusively on strategies based on linear separating codes in the rest of this section and in the one following it.
CONSTRUCTION OF GOOD LINEAR SEPARATING CODES.
Definition 3.3 (ε-Biased Codes). A binary linear code of block length n is defined to be ε-biased if every non-zero codeword in C has Hamming weight between (1/2 − ε)n and (1/2 + ε)n. Now Lemma 3.2 implies the following separation property of ε-biased codes.
LEMMA 3.4. If a binary linear code C is ε-biased for some ε < 1/14, then C is (2, 2)-separating.
Thus, in order to get explicit (2, 2)-separating codes (and hence, an explicit strategy for the secret guessing game), it suffices to explicitly construct an ε-biased code for ε < 1/14.
A simple explicit construction of ε-biased codes can be obtained by concatenating an outer Reed-Solomon code with relative distance (1 − 2ε) with an inner binary Hadamard code. It is easy to see that all nonzero codewords have relative Hamming weight between (1/2 − ε) and 1/2, and thus this gives an ε-biased space. However, this construction encodes m bits into O(m 2 /ε 2 ) bits. Other explicit constructions of ε-biased codes of dimension m and block length O(m 2 /ε 2 ) are also known . In fact, the explicit construction of a secret guessing strategy with O(log 2 N ) questions in Chung et al. [2001] is based on one of the ε-biased codes from . All these constructions suffer from the drawback of needing (log 2 N ) questions, while we would like to achieve the optimal O(log N ) questions.
But, there are also known ways to achieve ε-biased codes with block length O(m/ε O(1) ). For example, one can use a concatenated scheme with outer code any explicitly specified code with relative distance (1 − O(ε)) over a constant alphabet size (that depends on ε), and inner code itself being a Reed-Solomon concatenated with Hadamard code. Specifically, one can use for the outer code the construction due to that achieves rate (ε) and alphabet size 2 O(1/ε) . It is easy to check that this gives an explicit [O(m/ε 4 ), m] 2 ε-biased code. A better choice of inner code can be used to bring down the block length to O(m/ε 3 ) ], but this is not very important to us since this will only improve the number of questions by a constant factor.
We therefore have the next lemma.
LEMMA 3.1 [ALON . For any ε > 0, there exists an explicitly specified family of constant-rate binary linear ε-biased codes.
Applying the preceding with any ε < 1/14, and using the connection to separating codes from Lemma 3.4 and the result of Lemma 3.1, we get the following theorem.
THEOREM 3.5. There is an explicit oblivious strategy for the 2-secrets guessing game that uses O(log N ) questions, where N is the size of the universe from which the secrets are drawn.
An Efficient Algorithm to Recover the Secrets
The construction of an explicit strategy using O(log N ) questions is not difficult, and follows rather easily once one realizes the connection to ε-biased spaces. However, a fairly basic and important point has been ignored so far in our description. We have only focused on strategies that "combinatorially" limit the possible pairs of secrets to a star or a triangle. But how can B figure out the star or triangle, as the case may be, once he receives the answers to all the questions? One obvious method is to simply go over all pairs of secrets and check each one for consistency with the answers. By the combinatorial property of the strategy, we will be left with only a star or a triangle. The disadvantage of this approach, however, is that it requires O(N 2 ) time. We would ideally like to have a strategy to recover the secrets that runs in poly(log N ) time, since we are thinking of N as very large. Strategies with such an efficient secret-recovery algorithm are called invertible strategies in Chung et al. [2001] .
In this section, we present a connection between list decoding and the 2-secrets guessing game. Using this connection, we are able to give an oblivious invertible strategy that uses only O(log N ) questions. The time to recover the secrets (i.e., the triangle or a succinct representation of the star) is O(log 3 N ).
4.1. CONNECTION TO LIST DECODING. We will need the following combinatorial bound for list decoding in the proof of Lemma 4.2, as well as Lemma 4.5 in the next section. PROOF. Let C be a code as in the statement of the lemma and assume that B is using C for its strategy. Let X = {x 1 , x 2 } be the set which A claims he picked after giving all the answers. Let the set of answers be a = (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n ). Then for each i, we must have either C(x 1 ) i = a i or C(x 2 ) i = a i , since A is supposed to answer each question according to one of x 1 or x 2 . Now by the property of C, we have C(x 1 ) i = C(x 2 ) i for all i ∈ A for some set A ⊆ [n] of size at least (1/2 − ε)n. For each i ∈ A we have C(x 1 ) i = C(x 2 ) i = a i , and for each i / ∈ A, exactly one of C(x 1 ) i and C(x 2 ) i equals a i . It follows that either C(x 1 ) or C(x 2 ) is within Hamming distance (n−|A|)/2 of a; assume without loss of generality that it is C(x 1 ). Then 
Guessing Secrets Efficiently via List Decoding
42:9
The algorithm for B to recover the secrets (i.e., the triangle or star) after receiving the answer vector a is as follows.
(1) Perform list decoding of the code C using the assumed algorithm to find the set, say S, of all x ∈ {0, 1} m for which (a, C(x)) ≤ ( We now argue the correctness of the algorithm. First note that any pair returned by the algorithm is a proper solution to guessing secrets. This is because the set S x consists of precisely those secrets that could form the other secret in a pair with x so that the resulting pair will be consistent with the answers a. We next prove that any pair (x, x ) which is a consistent solution to the 2-secrets problem for the answers a will be found by the algorithm. Appealing to the (2, 2)-separation property of C (implied by Lemma 3.4, since C is ε-biased for some ε < 1/14), the previous two facts imply that the final set of pairs will either be a triangle or a star.
If a pair (x, x ) is consistent with a, then we know by the initial arguments in this proof that min{ (a, C(x)), (a, C(x ))} ≤ (1/4 + ε/2)n. Assume without loss of generality that (a, C(x)) ≤ (1/4 + ε/2)n. Then, x will be found as part of the set S in the first list decoding step of the previous algorithm. Now for each i such that C(x) i = a i , we must have C(x ) i = a i , or otherwise (x, x ) would not be a consistent pair for the answers a. Hence x will be a solution to the erasure decoding performed in the second step. It follows that x ∈ S x and that (x, x ) will be output by the algorithm, as desired. Now we move to the runtime analysis of the algorithm. By the hypothesis of the lemma, the first list decoding step can be performed in O(T (m)) time. Moreover, the size of the list S returned will be bounded by an absolute constant. Specifically, applying Proposition 4.1 with δ = 1/2 − ε, we find, after a simple calculation, that list decoding up to a fraction (1/4 + ε/2) of errors requires lists of size at most (ε 2 − 3ε + 1/4) −1 , which is less than 24.5 for ε < 1/14. Hence, we will have |S| ≤ 24 and therefore the second erasure decoding step will only be performed for O(1) choices of x.
For the second step we critically use the fact that C is a linear code, and hence erasure list decoding amounts to finding all solutions to a linear system. The set S x , therefore, is either empty or the coset of a linear subspace, say W x , of F m 2 , and in the latter case can be represented by one solution together with a basis for W x . Hence, an O(m 2 ), size representation of each nonempty S x can be computed in the time needed to solve a linear system, which is certainly O(m 3 ). Hence the previous algorithm finds either the triangle or star of all pairs of secrets consistent with the answer vector a in O(T (m) + m 3 ) time. Note that in the case when it outputs a star, the number of pairs could be quite large (as high as (N − 1) in case the answer vector a exactly matches C(x) for some secret x). The algorithm exploits the fact that the nonhub vertices of the star, being the set of solutions to a linear system, can be described succinctly as the coset of a linear space.
Remark 4.3. We stress here that the use of list decoding in the preceding result is critical, and unique decoding does not suffice for the aforementioned application. This is because for any pair (x, x ) which is consistent with a, we are only guaranteed that one of x or x is within Hamming distance (1/4 + ε/2)n from a. Thus, we need to perform decoding up to a radius that is a fraction (1/4 + ε/2) of the block length. Therefore, if we were to perform unique decoding, we would need a relative distance of (1/2 + ε), which is known to be impossible for binary codes unless they just have a constant number of codewords. This is not very useful (this is a standard result in coding theory called the Plotkin bound, see, e. g., van Lint [1999, Section 5.2] ). Also, note that after the list decoding algorithm finds the set S of codewords close to a, the application gives a natural postprocessing routine to prune the list and actually zero down the possibilities to the true solutions.
THE FINAL RESULT USING SPECIFIC LIST DECODABLE CODES.
We now prove that explicit codes with the property needed in Lemma 4.2 exist, and thus conclude our main algorithmic result about the 2-secrets guessing game. The result of Lemma 4.5 is quite standard and can be proved easily using known techniques on concatenated codes. The only new element is the requirement of an ε-biased code, but, as we shall see, this necessitates no significant change in the proof technique.
We need the following result on list decoding Reed-Solomon codes. 
PROOF. We only sketch the proof, since it is by now quite routine. Given α < 1/2, we pick ε = O ((1/2 − α) 2 ). The code construction will be the concatenation of an outer Reed-Solomon code C RS of rate smaller than ε with inner code C in being an explicitly specified ε/2-biased binary linear code (such a code exists by Lemma 3.1). It is clear that the resulting concatenated code, say C, has minimum relative distance at least (1 − ε)(1/2 − ε/2) > 1/2 − ε, and maximum relative distance at most 1 · (1/2 + ε/2) < 1/2 + ε. Hence C is definitely an ε-biased code.
Let the Reed-Solomon code be defined over GF(2 ) and have block length n 0 = 2 . Let the block length of C in be n 1 . The block length of C is then N = n 0 n 1 . To list decode a received word r ∈ F n 2 , we first divide r into n 0 blocks r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r n 0 corresponding to the n 0 inner encodings, where each r i ∈ F n 1 2 . Each of the r i 's is decoded by brute force to produce a list L i of all ζ ∈ GF(2 ) for which (C in (ζ ), r i ) ≤ βn 1 , for some β, where α < β < 1/2. Since δ(C in ) ≥ 1/2 − ε and β = 1/2 − ( √ ε), it follows by Proposition 4.1 that for each i,
Now if x is such that (C(x), r) ≤ α N , then by an averaging argument for at least an α/β fraction of i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n 0 , we must have C RS (x) i ∈ L i . Therefore, to finish the list decoding it suffices to list decode the outer Reed-Solomon code to find all x for which C RS (x) has an element from L i at the ith position for at least αn 0 /β values of i. If the rate of C RS is at most O(α 2 ε/β 2 ), this can be accomplished in O((n 0 /ε) 2 log 2 n 0 ) time by the result of Theorem 4.4 stated before. This completes the proof of the lemma.
Applying the result of Lemma 4.5 with α = 1/4+1/28 = 2/7 and any ε < 1/14, gives an explicit construction of the codes which were needed in Lemma 4.2, with a quadratic list decoding algorithm. The O(log 3 N ) time required to perform the "simple, clean-up" erasure decodings in Lemma 4.2 therefore dominates the overall time to recover the triangle or star of secrets. This gives our main result of this section, which achieves the optimal (up to constant factors) number of questions, together with a poly(log N ) algorithm to recover the secrets. 
The Case of More than Two Secrets
One can also consider the situation when the player A has k > 2 secrets. In this case, stated in the same graph-theoretic language that we used to describe the 2-secrets problem, the goal of B would be to find a k-uniform hypergraph H with vertex set being the N secrets with the property that every two hyperedges of H intersect. Let us call such a hypergraph an intersecting hypergraph.
EXPLICIT OBLIVIOUS STRATEGIES WITH O(log N ) QUESTIONS.
Unlike the case of graphs where there were only two classes of such graphs, namely a triangle or a star, the situation for k-uniform hypergraphs is much more complicated. A classification of intersecting k-uniform hypergraphs is known for k = 3 (see Chung et al. [2001] for pointers related to this), but is open for k > 3. Nevertheless, there exist explicit strategies which will allow B to "combinatorially" reduce the possibilities to an intersecting hypergraph, even though we do not know any method for B to actually find some representation of this hypergraph short of trying out all k-element subsets of secrets and pruning out the inconsistent ones. This follows from a connection of the k-secrets guessing problem to the study of 2k-universal families of binary strings. The latter problem concerns finding a subset S ⊂ {0, 1} N of as small a size as possible with the property that for every subset of 2k indices i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i 2k and every (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a 2k ) ∈ {0, 1} 2k , there exists a string x ∈ S such that x i j = a j for each j = 1, 2, . . . , 2k. Explicit constructions of such universal families of very small size, namely at most c k log N , are known [Naor and Naor 1993; Naor et al. 1995] , where c k is a constant that depends exponentially on k.
We claim this implies the existence of explicit oblivious strategies using c k log N questions for the k-secrets guessing game. Indeed, let {y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y n } be a 2k-universal family of N -bit strings for some n ≤ c k log N . For 1 ≤ i ≤ n, define the function f i : [N ] → {0, 1} as follows: For each x ∈ [N ], f i (x) is simply the xth bit of the string y i . In other words, the string y i gives the truth table of the function f i . Clearly if the y i 's are explicitly specified, then so are the functions f i . We claim that the sequence of questions f 1 , f 2 , . . . , f n is a valid oblivious strategy for the k-secrets guessing game. This is because for every pair of disjoint sets of k secrets each, say
, by the 2k-universality property there exists some i for which f i (x) = 0 for each x ∈ S 1 and f i (z) = 1 for each z ∈ S 2 . This implies that the answer to question number i rules out one of the sets S 1 or S 2 as being a possible set of k secrets consistent with all answers to the questions f 1 , f 2 , . . . , f n . This is exactly what we wanted to show, and the k-sets of secrets consistent with any answer to the questions f 1 , f 2 , . . . , f n therefore form an intersecting k-uniform hypergraph.
The best-known construction of 2k-universal families, due to Naor et al. [1995] , achieves c k = 2 2k+o(k) . We therefore have the following theorem.
THEOREM 5.1. For the k-secrets guessing game over a universe of size N , there exists an explicit oblivious strategy for B that uses at most 2 2k+o(k) log N questions.
AN EFFICIENT PARTIAL SOLUTION FOR THE k-SECRETS
GAME. For the case of k > 2 secrets, the question of whether there exists a strategy, together with an efficient algorithm to actually find a representation of the intersecting hypergraph, is wide open. We instead aim for the weaker goal of finding a small "core" of secrets such that any k-set which A might pick must intersect the core in at least one secret. This at least gives useful partial information about the set of secrets which A could have picked.
This version of the problem is quite easily solved if we could ask not just binary questions, but questions with answers that lie in a larger alphabet [q] = {1, 2, . . . , q}; that is, each of the n questions that B asks is now a function
For any set of k secrets which A might pick, the sequence of answers a ∈ [q] n must agree with the correct answers to one of the secrets for at least n/k values of i. If q is a prime power bigger than k, there are known explicit constructions of q-ary linear codes, say C, with N codewords and block length O(log N ) which are efficiently list-decodable from a fraction (1−1/k) of errors [Guruswami and Sudan 2000] . Basing the questions F i on the n positions of the code (as in the earlier binary case), the answer vector a of A will differ from at least one secret in A's set in at most a fraction (1 − 1/k) of positions. The list decoding algorithm, when run on input a, will output a small list this includes this secret.
When B is only allowed binary questions, we can still give such a "core finding" strategy as follows. Pick q to be a power of 2 larger than k 2 , and C to be an explicit q-ary linear code that is list-decodable using lists of size poly(k) from a fraction (1 − 1/k 2 ) of errors [Guruswami and Sudan 2000] . As before, we first encode each secret by C to get a string of length n = O(log N ) over [q] . We then encode each element of [q] further using a 2k-universal family F of strings in {0, 1} q ; that is, we encode j ∈ [q], by the string comprising the jth entry from the set of strings in F. In other words, we concatenate C with the 2k-universal family F to get a binary code C . Player B now asks A for the bits of the encoding of the secret as per the concatenated code C .
Using the 2k-universal property of F, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, B can recover an intersecting k-hypergraph H i on [q] for the value of the ith symbol of the encoding of the k secrets by C. B can do this by a brute-force search over all k-element subsets of q, and since q, k are constants, this only takes constant time for each i. B then picks one of the hyperedges E i from H i arbitrarily, and then picks an element a i ∈ [q] from it at random.
Let S = {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x k } be the set of k-secrets that A picked. Note that E i must intersect the set S i = {C(x 1 ) i , . . . , C(x k ) i } consisting of the ith symbols of the encoding by C of the secrets in S. Therefore, for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we have a i ∈ S i with probability at least 1/k. Hence, we will have a i ∈ S i for at least an expected fraction 1/k of the i's. An averaging argument then implies that there must exist a j, 1 ≤ j ≤ k, for which a i = C(x j ) i for at least a 1/k 2 fraction of i's. Therefore, the assumed list decoding algorithm for C on input a will find a small list that includes the secret x j . This lets us conclude the next theorem. 5.3. LOWER BOUNDS FOR THE k-SECRETS GAME. As mentioned earlier, there is an oblivious algorithm for solving the k-secrets problem by asking c k log N questions. An easy probabilistic argument shows that the smallest possible c k is O(k2 2k ). This also follows from the result of Kleitman and Spencer [1973] that shows (nonexplicitly) that there is a 2k-universal family of N -bit strings consisting of O(k2 2k log N ) strings. The next result shows that no oblivious algorithm can do much better, and Proposition 5.4 following that extends this to adaptive strategies. 
, there exists some i for which f i (x) = ε for each x ∈ S 1 and f i (z) = 1 − ε for each z ∈ S 2 , where ε ∈ {0, 1}. Our objective is to show that n is large. To do so, pick randomly and independently two disjoint subsets S 1 and S 2 of [N ], where |S 1 | = |S 2 | = k − 1. We say that f i separates S 1 and S 2 if there is an ε ∈ {0, 1} such that f i (x) = ε for each x ∈ S 1 and f i (z) = 1 − ε for each z ∈ S 2 . A simple computation shows that for each fixed i, the probability that f i separates the two random sets S 1 and S 2 is smaller than 2 1−2k . Therefore, by linearity of expectation, there are some two sets S 1 and S 2 as before which are separated by at most n2 1−2k functions f i . Fix such S 1 , S 2 and let I ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , n} be the set of all functions separating them. We claim that for each two distinct p, q ∈ [N ] \ (S 1 ∪ S 2 ), the two vectors ( f i ( p) : i ∈ I ) and ( f i (q) : i ∈ I ) must differ. Indeed, otherwise none of the functions f i will separate S 1 ∪ {p} and S 2 ∪ {q}, contradicting the fact that they form an oblivious strategy for solving the k-secrets problem. It thus follows that N − (2k − 2) ≤ 2 n2 1−2k , implying that n ≥ 2 2k−1 log(N − 2k + 2), and completing the proof.
We next show that even adaptive algorithms cannot solve the k-secrets problem using c k log N questions unless c k = ( PROOF. Let a k be as in the statement of the proposition. We claim that for every k ≥ 2, there is an intersecting k-uniform hypergraph H k on a k vertices which is a maximal intersecting hypergraph. In other words, one cannot add to it any additional edge (of size k) and keep it intersecting. Such a hypergraph is described in Erdős and Lovász [1975] . Here is the construction; the set of vertices consists of two disjoint sets, X k of size 2k − 2, and Y k of size [N ] → {0, 1} of B and for each copy H of H k , the player A can always save H (i.e., ensure that each edge of it can still serve as a valid set of k secrets) by an appropriate answer. Indeed, as H is intersecting, there cannot be an edge of H in F −1 (0) and another in F −1 (1), and hence either each edge of H intersects F −1 (0) and then A can answer 0 and save H , or each edge intersects F −1 (1), and then answering 1 will save H . This implies that the player A can save, in each question, at least half of the copies of H k left after the previous questions. As B cannot finish the guessing game as long as more than one copy of H k is still valid (because the maximality of H k ensures that the union of every two copies is not intersecting) it follows that the number of questions required is at least log N a k ≥ a k log N − a k log a k , as needed.
As mentioned in Chung et al. [2001] the question of guessing secrets may also be of interest when the questions have more than two possible answers. We conclude the article by pointing out that several aspects of this variant have been studied by various researchers under the name parent identifying codes. For more details, see,
